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Unmanned aircraft will equip with a detect-and-avoid (DAA) system that enables them to comply with the 
requirement to "see and avoid" other aircraft, an important layer in the overall set of procedural, strategic and tactical 
separation methods designed to prevent mid-air collisions. Regulators will establish minimum operating standards for 
DAA effectiveness, but different combinations of algorithms, displays and procedures could be used to meet those 
standards. The research presented in this paper indicates the effectiveness of the combined pilot-DAA system as a 
function of the DAA design requirements and provides data that may be used to model the behavior of pilots when 
employing such systems. Two simulations involving 21 professional unmanned aircraft system (UAS) pilots evaluated 
eight different DAA system designs in order to assess their ability to maintain the "well clear" separation standard, i.e., 
the state of maintaining a safe distance from other aircraft that would not normally cause the initiation of a collision 
avoidance maneuver by either aircraft. When the traffic display was integrated with the primary mission map directly in 
front of the pilot, there were fewer losses of well clear. Greater warning time provided to the pilot was strongly correlated 
with success in remaining well clear. Pilots' ability to separate from aircraft with cooperative and non-cooperative 
surveillance systems was nearly the same after accounting for the amount of alert time provided in each encounter, 
although the limited surveillance volume for the airborne-equipped aircraft meant alerts tended to occur later and 
therefore were more difficult to resolve.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Regulations to establish operational and performance requirements for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are 
being developed by a consortium of government, industry and academic institutions [1]. Those requirements will 
apply to the new detect-and-avoid (DAA) systems and other equipment necessary to integrate UAS with the 
United States’ National Airspace System (NAS) and will be determined according to their contribution to the 
overall safety case. That safety case requires demonstration that DAA-equipped UAS operating in the NAS meet 
an airspace safety threshold (AST). Several key gaps must be closed in order to link equipment requirements to 
an airspace safety case.  Foremost among these is calculation of the system’s “risk ratio”—the degree to which a 
particular system mitigates violation of an aircraft separation standard [2]. The risk ratio of a DAA system, in 
combination with risk ratios of other collision mitigation mechanisms, will determine the overall safety of the 
airspace measured in terms of the number of collisions per flight hour. It is not known what the effectiveness is of 
a pilot-in-the-loop DAA system or even what parameters of the DAA system most improve the pilot’s ability to 
maintain separation. The relationship between the DAA system design and the overall effectiveness of the DAA 
system that includes the pilot, expressed as a risk ratio, must be determined before DAA operational and 
performance requirements can be finalized. 
Much research across the globe has been devoted to integrating UAS into non-segregated airspace [3], [4], 
[5], [6]. Several traffic displays intended for use as part of a DAA system have gone through human-in-the-loop 
simulation and flight-testing. Most of these evaluations were part of development programs to produce a 
deployable system, so it is unclear how to generalize particular aspects of those designs to general requirements 
for future traffic displays [7]. Other displays have undergone testing to collect data that may generalize to new 
displays, but have not been evaluated in the context of the development of an overall safety case for UAS 
equipped with DAA systems in the NAS [8].  Other research efforts focus on DAA surveillance performance and 
separation standards.  Together with this work, they are expected to facilitate validation of the airspace safety case 
[9], [10]. 
The contribution of the present work is to quantify the effectiveness of the pilot-automation system to remain 
well clear as a function of display and algorithm features. This quantification will allow selection of a minimum 
set of DAA design features that meets the AST, a set that may not be unique for all UAS platforms. A second 
objective is to collect and analyze pilot performance parameters that will improve the modeling of overall DAA 
system performance in non-human-in-the-loop simulations. Simulating the DAA-equipped UAS in such batch 
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experiments will allow investigation of a much larger number of encounters than is possible in human 
simulations. This capability is necessary to demonstrate that a particular set of DAA requirements meets the AST 
under all foreseeable operational conditions.  Moreover, results related to the performance of the pilots’ use of 
displays and the time they required to carry out different aspects of this task may be found in a companion paper 
[11]. 
This paper will provide some background about well clear for UAS DAA systems. It will then describe the 
methodology used in two human-in-the-loop simulations to evaluate eight different display variants with a variety 
of separation algorithms. Next, it presents the experiment results and concludes with a summary and suggestions 
for future work. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The self-separation (SS) function of a DAA system is a means of compliance with the regulatory requirements 
(14CFR Part 91, §91.111 and §91.113) to “see and avoid” and to remain well clear of other aircraft. The concept 
of well clear has been proposed as an airborne separation standard to which a DAA system must adhere, and 
performing SS correctly means remaining well clear of other aircraft [12]. In order to build a DAA system that 
helps the pilot remain well clear, a quantitative definition of well clear must be defined. 
Well clear is defined as the state of maintaining a safe distance from other aircraft that would not normally 
cause the initiation of a collision avoidance (CA) maneuver by either aircraft [2]. A well clear separation standard 
should be large enough to (1) avoid corrective maneuvers by intruders (i.e., any aircraft detected in range of the 
UAS’s surveillance system) that are equipped with a CA system (e.g., Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance 
System (TCAS)—or Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS)), (2) minimize traffic alert issuances by air 
traffic control (ATC), and (3) avoid excessive concern for pilots of proximate piloted aircraft [13]. However, a 
well clear separation standard also should be small enough to prevent the need for large deviations that potentially 
disrupt traffic flow and ATC separation management plans.  
A distance-based separation minima proposed by EUROCONTROL was considered [14]; however, the lack 
of a time separation criterion creates interoperability issues with when an intruder’s collision avoidance system 
would activate.  The definition of well clear used here predates the work performed in U.S. by the UAS Sense and 
Avoid Science and Research Panel [15], whose charter was to derive a DAA well clear separation standard.  
However, the two approaches share a similar heritage.  The separation standard for well clear used here is based 
on logic that predicts the closest point of approach (CPA) between the UAS and other aircraft, and thresholds 
were selected to be conceptually outside the range at which TCAS will trigger a resolution advisory. For this 
study, a loss of well clear is defined to occur when the predicted CPA horizontal separation is less than 0.8 nmi, 
CPA altitude separation is less than 400 feet, and time-to-CPA is less than 40 seconds. The closest point of 
approach between two aircraft is an estimate of the future minimum slant range. Time-to-CPA is defined as the 
difference between the time at predicted CPA and current time. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
This research consisted of two experiments involving professional UAS pilots situated at a UAS ground-
control station (GCS). The objective of the first experiment (Experiment 1) was to evaluate candidate DAA 
displays and algorithms for their effectiveness in helping pilots remain well clear of all traffic. More specifically, 
Experiment 1 investigated (1) the appropriate alerting thresholds for self-separation, i.e., remaining well clear, (2) 
minimum information requirements for DAA displays, and (3) advanced display features that could potentially 
improve accuracy and expediency in pilot’s determining, negotiating, and executing maneuvers to maintain well 
clear. A follow-on experiment (Experiment 2) leveraged lessons learned from Experiment 1 to continue the 
evaluation of candidate displays and algorithms with respect to a pilot’s ability to remain well clear. Furthermore, 
communication latencies and limitations in surveillance detection range and field of regard were modeled to 
increase the fidelity of the overall DAA system. 
A. Participants 
A total of 21 pilot participants participated in these two studies. Participants were required to hold, at a 
minimum, an Instrument Rating or pilot certification through the military. The pilots were either members of the 
California Air National Guard (163rd Reconnaissance Squadron) or Beale Air Force Base, and all had experience 
flying the Global Hawk (RQ-4) or Reaper (MQ-9). Two retired air traffic controllers with experience at the 
Oakland Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZOA) and three pseudo-pilot confederates also participated in these 
studies. 
B. Simulation Environment 
The UAS pilot participants were positioned at a UAS GCS, either the Vigilant Spirit Control Station (VSCS) 
[16] (see Figure 1(a)) provided by the Air Force Research Laboratory, or the NASA-developed Cockpit Situation 
Display (CSD) (see Figure 1(b)). The Multi-Aircraft Control Station (MACS) [17] provided the ATC 
environment with pseudo-pilot stations for controlling simulated “manned” aircraft traffic within the airspace. 
The CSD is an interactive 3D volumetric display designed to provide pilots with awareness of their 
surroundings [18]. In Experiment 1, it was used to display traffic, trajectory information, and loss-of-well-clear 
alerts, and it provided tools to aid the pilot in selecting maneuvers to prevent losses of well clear when necessary. 
The CSD served as a “standalone” display with relevant DAA information located next to the pilot’s primary 
command and control display, the VSCS. When co-located with the VSCS, the CSD was displayed in the bottom-
left monitor in Figure 1(a). The CSD was not used in Experiment 2 for reasons explained in Section III.C.  
The VSCS’s primary monitor contains a Tactical Situation Display (TSD, shown at the bottom-center of 
Figure 1(a)), which displayed the UAS ownship and mission route over a moving map. All commands performed 
by the pilot participants were executed using editing and navigation windows within the TSD. A second monitor 
displayed VSCS’s simulated out-the-window nose-camera view (top-center of Figure 1(a)). This “soda straw” 
nose-camera view provided pilots with accurate terrain information and an integrated head-up display that 
contained current airspeed, altitude and heading information.  
 
(a)  (b) 
Figure 1: (a) Vigilant Spirit Control Station, (b) Cockpit Situation Display 
 
MACS is a simulation platform that instantiates small- or large-scale airspace environments. MACS also 
models the participation of other flights by simulating flight paths of individual aircraft based on their source and 
destination airports, flight plan, flight rules, and confederate pilot interactions. For these experiments, MACS was 
configured to provide confederate pilots an interface to control multiple aircraft as well as an emulation of the 
display system replacement (DSR) for the confederate air traffic controller.   
For these simulations, sectors 40 and 41 from Oakland Air Route Traffic Control Center were used. The UAS 
pilots commanded a simulated unmanned aircraft with characteristics similar to a Predator-B. Realistic current-
day traffic levels and flows were simulated within sectors 40 and 41. 
C. Experiment Design 
In Experiment 1, a mixed factorial, repeated measure design was used to study pilot response times, number 
of losses of well clear, separation at closest point of approach, and other DAA measures. A 2x2x2 experiment 
design matrix was used (see Table 1) involving three independent variables: display configuration, level of traffic 
information and resolution tools, and lead time for self-separation alerts.  
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Experiment 1 - Experiment Design Matrix 
Traffic 
Information 
Display 
Configuration 
Self-separation 
Alerting Time (s) 
Basic Standalone 80 
Advanced Integrated 110 
 
The standalone display configurations provided traffic information via the CSD but required the pilot to 
command and control from the “separate” VSCS display. Conversely, the integrated display configurations 
provided traffic information within the VSCS itself; i.e., all information and controls were integrated into a single 
display.  
The basic (minimum) traffic information configuration included a basic set of traffic information to aid the 
pilot in remaining well clear: intruder’s location, ground speed, relative altitude, vertical velocity indicator, 
heading, flight identifier (ID), range, and bearing. The advanced information configuration included all the basic 
elements, augmented with alerting indications on traffic that may cause a loss of well clear, graphical depiction of 
CPA location, time-to-CPA, a trial planner tool, and maneuver recommendations to resolve predicted losses of 
well clear.  
The two self-separation alerting thresholds governed the self-separation alert lead time, the lead time an alert 
provides to a pilot in which to act to remain well clear. Like well clear, the alert lead time was based on time-to-
CPA. It is important the alerting time of a DAA system be acceptable to air traffic controllers. The larger value, 
110 seconds prior to CPA, was based on playing back short traffic scenarios through MACS and having ATC 
participants assess when they would provide traffic advisories (TAs) for various encounters. The results revealed, 
on average, that ATC gave TAs at 110 seconds time-to-CPA. The smaller value, 80 seconds prior to CPA, was 
selected to study the effectiveness of pilots to remain well clear with relatively less alerting time. 
As a follow-on to Experiment 1, four additional displays were evaluated in Experiment 2, for a total of eight 
display concepts. Since the integrated display configurations were more effective in aiding the pilot to remain 
well clear than the standalone display conditions, the focus in Experiment 2 was to evaluate differences between 
specific advanced display features from Experiment 1 using only the integrated display (i.e., the VSCS).  As for 
Experiment 1, Experiment 2 also used a one-way repeated-measures factorial design to collect data on pilot 
measured response, number of losses of well clear, separation at closest point of approach (CPA), and other DAA 
measures. Four display configurations were used to create a simple four-cell experiment. All test configurations 
used the integrated display concept (dropped standalone) from Experiment 1, where traffic display information 
was co-located within the GCS. Display 1 augmented the “Basic Integrated” display configuration from 
Experiment 1 with (1) alerting indications on targets that may cause a loss of well clear and (2) graphical 
depiction of CPA location. This display was considered the baseline in Experiment 2.  The second display 
configuration (Display 2) refined Display configuration 1 by introducing a trial planner tool, which allowed the 
pilot to use the display to interactively search for heading and altitude changes that are clear of all traffic when a 
predicted loss of well clear is presented. The third display configuration (Display 3) added to the basic 
information-only display an indication of a recommended maneuver from Autoresolver-AD (see Autoresolver 
Adaptor section of [19]) that a pilot could easily execute when a predicted loss of well clear is alerted. The final 
display configuration (Display 4) added to the basic information-only display the union of Displays 3 and 4.  
Also, a single self-separation alerting threshold of 110 seconds prior to CPA was employed; hence it was not an 
independent variable. 
Every pilot participant was involved in four trials using each display configuration once. The order of display 
configurations for each pilot participant was counter-balanced. Also, for this experiment an embedded variable 
was added to simulate cooperative- and non-cooperative sensor performance. Details on how cooperative and 
non-cooperative were modeled are described in Section III.0. This embedded surveillance variable was not 
counter-balanced. Each pilot for each display configuration experienced scripted traffic encounters; 
approximately two-thirds of the encounters were detected using simulated non-cooperative sensors (i.e., no 
electronic means of identifying aircraft and exchanging state information) aboard the UAS, and one-third were 
detected using the simulated cooperative sensor (i.e., electronic means of identifying aircraft and exchanging of 
state information).  This variable was not part of the experimental design, because the intent was to evaluate 
differences between the encounter types across the four display conditions in Experiment 2. 
D. Detect-and-avoid System 
The DAA system was simulated using a software architecture called JADEM (Java Architecture for DAA 
Modeling and Extensibility) [19] that models various components of DAA systems, including the detect, track, 
evaluate, prioritize, declare, determine, and command functions. The modeling of these functions is described 
briefly below. 
The detect and track function—or surveillance system— adapted for these simulations used spatial filtering 
that only displayed traffic within a range of 80 nmi of the cooperative sensor. This 80-nmi range is much larger 
than Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) specifications; however, in order to nullify the 
potential effect of undetected cooperative traffic precisely at the self-separation alert ranges, a broader, notional 
range for a cooperative sensor was employed. A non-cooperative sensor—a state-of-the-art airborne radar—was 
simulated using a similar procedure; however, only traffic within six nmi range, +/- 110 degrees azimuth off the 
current heading of the UAS, and +/- 20 degrees elevation between the center mass of the UAS were depicted on 
the display. State estimation was “perfect” for all traffic; thus, no tracking algorithm was employed.  
The evaluate, prioritize, and declare functions are responsible for evaluating each intruder detected by the 
surveillance system and determine its threat alerting level. To determine if a threat is predicted between a UAS 
and a given intruder, a reference trajectory is synthesized from the UAS’s known intent. A reference trajectory is 
also built for every intruder and modeled as a “dead-reckoned” extrapolation of the most recent intruder state 
(position and velocity). Time-synchronized progression along discretized projected states along the ownship’s 
and intruder’s trajectories are used to find the predicted CPA—the minimum slant range along the trajectories. 
The threats are classified using the predicted CPA, and they are prioritized based on their separation and urgency. 
The separation criteria, alerting time, and alert color-scheme are illustrated in Figure 2. The five alerting levels 
used in these simulations are as follows: 
• Collision avoidance (CA) alert (red targets in Figure 2): The basis of this alert is to indicate to the 
pilot that s/he has lost well clear with another aircraft, and immediate action is required. Thus, the criteria 
for this alert are the same as the standard for well clear: predicted CPA horizontal separation is less than 
0.8 nmi, CPA altitude separation is less than 400 feet, and time-to-CPA is less than 40 seconds. Pilot 
action: Immediate action is required to regain well clear; notify ATC as soon as practicable after taking 
action. 
• Self-separation (SS) alert (yellow targets with red outline in Figure 2): This alert is similar to the CA 
alert above. It uses the same spatial separation; however, additional alert time is provided to give ample 
time for the pilot to take action. This alert level is the primary indication to the pilot that action is 
necessary to remain well clear. Much of the pilot’s effectiveness in maintaining well clear will be 
evaluated as a function of the lead time with which the pilot was first presented a self-separation alert. 
The criteria for a self-separation alert are as follows: predicted CPA horizontal separation is less than 0.8 
nmi, CPA altitude separation is less than 400 feet, and time-to-CPA is less than 80 or 110 seconds, 
depending on the test case. Pilot action: Action to remain well clear will be necessary if the encounter 
does not change; coordinate with ATC to determine an appropriate maneuver, if there is sufficient time to 
remain well clear. 
• Self-separation “buffered” alert (yellow targets with black outline in Figure 2): This alert includes a 
spatial buffer to the SS alert criteria. Predicted CPA horizontal separation is less than 1.2 nmi, CPA 
altitude separation is less than 900 feet, and time-to-CPA is less than 80 or 110 seconds. Pilot action: 
Action to remain well clear will be necessary only if intruder suddenly makes a horizontal or vertical 
maneuver. 
• Preventive alert (white targets in Figure 2): Predicted CPA horizontal separation is less than 2.0 nmi, 
CPA altitude separation is less than 900 feet, and time-to-CPA is less than 80 or 110 seconds. Pilot 
action: No action necessary to avoid this aircraft, but its presence should be considered when determining 
a resolution maneuver to avoid other aircraft. 
• “No” alert (gray targets in Figure 2): Intruder is within surveillance detection range but does not satisfy 
the criteria for any of the above alert levels. 
The determine function is the process by which the pilot determines a maneuver to resolve an alerted threat. If 
the pilot receives a SS alert, the concept is for the pilot to use the display and algorithms to select a maneuver, 
coordinate with ATC, and execute it prior to losing well clear. A conflict resolution algorithm, called GRACE 
[19], was used to simulate the collision avoidance function. Upon receiving a CA alert, GRACE computes a 
hypothesized “best” maneuver—a horizontal vector or altitude change—to execute in order to regain well clear. 
The maneuver is depicted on the display to trigger pilot action. In the case of a SS alert, depending on the display 
configuration, the pilot may use (a) his own judgment (basic condition), (b) a trial planner (advanced condition), 
or (c) Autoresolver-AD maneuver recommendations (advanced condition) to avoid losing well clear. 
Autoresolver-AD is adapted from the Autoresolver algorithm for conventional air traffic to enable UAS to remain 
well clear within the detect-and-avoid domain [20]. Key adaptations for DAA applications include contending 
with shorter look-ahead times, lack of trajectory intent information for intruder aircraft, smaller spatial separation 
standards, introduction of temporal separation requirements in addition to spatial, more frequent update rates, and 
single “ownship” point-of-view vs. centralized separation management of multiple aircraft.
 
Figure 2: Detect-and-avoid alerting levels and criteria. 
E. Procedures 
Pilot participants began with extensive training on the basic functionality of VSCS. Prior to each experiment 
trial, participants were trained on the distinct aspects of the display configuration for that trial and then completed 
a 20-minute practice scenario. Participants completed four experiment trials from the set of experiment 
configurations described in Section III.C. Experiment trials were approximately 38 minutes long. After each trial, 
participants completed a post-trial subjective questionnaire. At the end of the experiment, participants completed 
a post-simulation questionnaire. 
During each trial, the pilot was responsible for flying a pre-filed mission route. The UAS mission was 
prescribed under Instrument Flight Rules, so the pilot was required to comply with ATC clearances. Furthermore, 
the pilot was responsible for monitoring traffic display alerts to maintain safety of flight. When a CA alert was 
presented, the pilot was required to expeditiously execute the prescribed collision avoidance maneuver presented 
on the display and notify ATC of their divergence from their clearance. Data for reaction times and maneuver 
types for collision avoidance were not recorded, as this information was not pertinent to the experiment 
objectives; these tasks were required only to add realism to the environment. The focus of the experiment was on 
the information and actions prior to losing well clear.  
When a SS alert was presented, it was the pilot’s discretion to determine if/when a maneuver was necessary. 
If a maneuver was necessary the pilot was responsible for requesting a clearance from ATC based on their desired 
maneuver as time permitted in order to remain well clear. When uploading a resolution maneuver, the pilot 
modified a downstream waypoint on its route, or commanded a heading, altitude, and/or indicated airspeed 
through the UAS’s autopilot system. Also, in order to present the pilot with a realistic workload, besides using the 
traffic display and information the pilot was also required to monitor and respond to system health status tasks 
and chat sessions.  These chat sessions would require the UAS pilots to engage dispatch to communicate 
information such as mission radio frequency changes, radial and distance checks, and fuel level remaining 
requests, however were secondary to complying with ATC clearances and maintaining safety of flight.  The pilot 
operated the UAS during the mission’s enroute portion only; no takeoff or landing was included in these 
simulations. 
F. Scenarios 
Pilots flew two different mission routes embedded within four trial conditions. The missions were based on 
realistic current-day routes allowed under special conditions (Certificate of Authorization or Waiver) in ZOA 
sectors 40 and 41. The first mission was a fire-monitoring mission, and the second was a coastal watch pattern. 
The traffic patterns and density were developed alongside an ATC subject matter expert and designed to represent 
a busy, current day in the chosen airspace. 
Within each trial, approximately eight traffic encounters causing SS alerts were designed into the scenarios. 
The encounters’ characteristics were designed using a combination of encounter angles (e.g., head-on, crossing, 
or overtaking), relative velocities (0 or 20 knots), and relative vertical trajectories (level-level or level-
transitioning). Confederate controllers facilitated the scripted encounters by issuing encounter-inducing 
clearances to specific pre-planned surrounding aircraft. 
IV. RESULTS 
Results are presented for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 in terms of the primary metrics: the proportion of 
encounters that resulted in loss of well clear, the severity of those losses and the timing associated with 
maneuvers that did not result in a loss.   
A. Losses of Well Clear in Experiment 1 
The most important metric related to the safety of the combined pilot-DAA system is the proportion of 
encounters for which it fails to maintain the well clear separation standard, referred to here as a loss of well clear 
(LoWC). This proportion depends on the lead time before the LoWC at which the alert is first issued, because, if 
the lead time is too short, there will not be adequate time for the pilot to determine a resolution maneuver, enter 
and upload it to the aircraft, and allow the aircraft to change its trajectory sufficiently to avoid a LoWC. If a large 
amount of warning time is provided to the pilot, it is expected that the LoWC proportion would become 
insensitive to that parameter, because other factors, such as late-maneuvering intruders and air traffic constraints, 
would overwhelm the additional benefit of a few extra seconds of warning.  
 
A histogram of the number of encounters experienced by the pilot participants as a function of the self-
separation alert initial warning time is shown in Figure 3. This chart also shows the outcomes of those encounters: 
the number of encounters for which the pilot-DAA system prevented a loss of well clear with the intruder is 
shown in green for each time-to-CPA bin, while the number of encounters that resulted in a LoWC is shown in 
red. The left-most bin represents those encounters that were first alerted with less than 40 seconds to CPA, which 
corresponds to the LoWC threshold. So, all of those encounters were “popup” LoWCs, because the pilot was not 
alerted until well clear had been lost. The next bin represents encounters between 40 and 55 seconds time-to-
CPA, which means the pilot had less than 20 seconds of warning before a LoWC occurred, and all but two of the 
18 encounters resulted in LoWCs. The three bins on the right represent encounters with warning times between 
55 and 110 seconds before predicted LoWC. Figure 4 presents the same data as a ratio of “red to green” for each 
time-to-CPA bin. The figure indicates that warnings less than 15 seconds prior to losing well clear nearly always 
resulted in a LoWC and warning times much greater than this number did not significantly (p>0.05) reduce the 
proportion of LoWC. Furthermore, the number of LoWCs did not significantly (p>0.05) decrease as a function of 
the number of trials performed by a test subject, suggesting that learning effects were negligible.  
The proportion of encounters that became LoWCs was also calculated as a function of the display 
configuration. Additional display elements may help the pilot avoid LoWCs if they provide appropriate 
information in a logical manner for the task, but they may also take more time to use or distract the pilot and 
increase the LoWC rate. For this analysis, “popup” LoWCs were filtered out, because they give little indication 
as to how effective the displays were at aiding the pilot to remain well clear. The overall proportion of LoWCs 
by display condition is shown in Figure 5.      
 
 Figure 3: Proportion of encounters that became losses of well clear by time 
to closest point of approach at which SS alert was first provided. 
 
Figure 2: Outcome of encounters (actual losses of well clear vs. those that were prevented)  
by time to closest point of approach at which SST alert was first provided. 
 
Figure 4: Proportion of encounters that became losses of well clear by 
display condition in Experiment 1. 
Twenty percent fewer LoWCs were produced when pilots used the integrated display as compared to the 
standalone display, and 45% fewer LoWCs were produced when pilots used the advanced display as compared to 
the basic display. Although these differences are large, they are not statistically significant (p>0.05) because of 
the large variability in the number of LoWCs from scenario to scenario. The two basic displays performed poorly, 
with nearly twice the rate of LoWCs as any of their advanced display counterparts. The LoWC rate metric 
appears to be helpful in ruling out the use of a basic display, but it cannot differentiate between the other display 
types, because none of the differences are statistically  (p>0.05). Additional safety and efficiency metrics are 
necessary to determine minimum requirements for a DAA algorithm and display system. 
B. Severity of Losses of Well Clear in Experiment 1 
A LoWC is a categorical failure to maintain the separation standard, but LoWCs are not all of the same 
severity, and the vast majority will not result in a mid-air collision.  It is therefore reasonable to investigate 
whether specific display elements reduce the severity of a LoWC and therefore provide a safety benefit.  In this 
analysis, “popup” LoWCs were also included.  
The first severity metric evaluated by display configuration is the amount of time spent in a LoWC.  It is 
expected that shorter LoWCs are, on average, less dangerous than longer ones, though specific exceptions to this 
rule are certainly possible.  The median time spent in LoWC for each of the display configurations is shown in 
Figure 6. The median amount of time spent overall in a LoWC was nine seconds across all the displays, reaching 
a high of 17 seconds for the “Basic Integrated” display and a low of only three seconds for the “Advanced 
Integrated” display.  This last result is the only statistically significant difference in median LoWC time from the 
other configurations (p<0.05).  It appears that the “Advanced Integrated” display allows the pilot to minimize the 
amount of time spent in a LoWC, even if it does not reduce the number of LoWCs relative to the other displays.  
 
Figure 6: Median time spent within a loss of well clear by display condition in Experiment 1. 
 
The second severity metric is an index of the separation between the aircraft at the closest point of approach.  
The separation severity index, Sindex, (see Equation (1)) is defined as the larger of the horizontal and vertical 
separations normalized by the required separation in each dimension: 
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where the h_sepCA and v_sepCA are the geometric portions of the well clear definition, i.e. CA alert, without the 
time-to-CPA criteria.  Note that it is possible for an intruder to be outside the geometric separation standard but 
still be in a well clear violation because the predicted CPA in the future is within the separation criteria and the 
current time-to-CPA is under 40 seconds.  In this study, h_sepCA = 0.8 nmi and v_sepCA = 400 ft.   
The worst predicted severity of all encounters that actually became a LoWC is shown in Figure 7 as a set of 
red bars.  Note that, in order to be a predicted LoWC, the severity index must have been predicted to be less than 
one at least once for each encounter, and indeed every red bar is at an index of one or below.  A severity index of 
one is on the edge of the geometric separation criteria for a LoWC.  The actual worst severity indices are shown 
in Figure 7 as a set of blue bars. Although all the blue bars represent a set of LoWCs, they need not have a 
severity index less than one, and indeed the median actual index is 1.17. This indicates, in practice, that most of 
the time pilots were separating the UAS from other aircraft on the edge of h_sepCA = 0.8 nmi and v_sepCA = 400 
ft.  This also represents a significant improvement from the median worst predicted index of 0.49.  On average, 
pilots achieved an increased separation between aircraft of 0.68 times the separation minima when the displays 
were available to them.  Further demonstrating the effectiveness of the displays is the fact that, although every 
one of these encounters is predicted to be a LoWC, only 37% actually penetrate the h_sepCA and v_sepCA criteria 
(see 37% of all blue bars for actual separation severity are below 1.0) and less than 5% have a separation severity 
index under 0.5.  
 
Figure 7: Actual and predicted separation severity for all LoWCs in Experiment 1. 
 
Pilots achieved slightly greater separation when using the integrated and advanced displays as compared to 
the standalone and basic versions, but the differences are neither statistically nor practically significant.  All 
displays provide a significant increase in actual separation severity when compared to its predicted separation 
severity and the “Advanced Integrated” display is correlated with significantly shorter times spent in a LoWC. 
C. Maneuver Timing Results in Experiment 1 
The final metrics related to the use and effectiveness of a DAA system are the amount of time required by the 
pilot from the first alert to upload of a resolution maneuver: i.e., pilot response time and the time-to-CPA at which 
maneuvers are uploaded to the aircraft. Each of these metrics can be further categorized by whether the pilot 
obtained an ATC clearance before s/he uploaded the maneuver, the standard procedure, or if they uploaded the 
maneuver without an amended clearance, a permissible but not preferable course of action. These metrics are 
important from a safety standpoint, because maneuvers executed without an ATC clearance can interfere with an 
air traffic controller’s plan for the traffic in their sector and contribute to secondary conflicts. Additional LoWCs 
can occur when longer times are required to determine and execute maneuvers and those maneuvers are executed 
more closely to the well clear boundary. In contrast to the previous section, all encounters in this section represent 
successful maneuvers for remaining well clear.  
 
 
Figure 8: Mean response time by time-to-CPA at which the first SS alert was provided,  
classified by whether or not the pilot obtained an ATC clearance before maneuvering in Experiment 1. 
 The time difference between the first SS alert and the first upload of a resolution maneuver is referred to here 
as pilot response time. As expected, ATC clearances were obtained under most circumstances, and the greater the 
time between the alert and upload, the greater the likelihood that an amended clearance was received. This 
suggests that additional time spent by the pilot in determining a course of action was rewarded by an improved 
approval rate from ATC. Figure 8 shows the mean response time (in terms of time-to-CPA) grouped by whether 
or not the pilot obtained an ATC clearance. In all time-to-CPA bins, mean response time is larger when obtaining 
a clearance, and—contradictory to the procedures for this experiment—there are instances where the pilot 
obtained a clearance from ATC prior to maneuvering when time-to-CPA was less than 40 seconds (i.e., well clear 
was already lost). As summarized in Table 2, median response times were significantly (p<0.05) shorter when an 
amended clearance was not obtained: 16 seconds without a clearance versus 27 seconds with a clearance. This 
difference illustrates that pilots were more likely to act without obtaining an ATC clearance when alerts occurred 
nearer to the well clear boundary. 
The response-time values help to explain the results presented previously that showed a low probability of 
resolving a potential LoWC when the alert time is less than 20 seconds. Because it typically takes a pilot 16 
seconds to determine and upload a resolution maneuver even without an ATC clearance, 20 seconds of warning 
leaves only a few seconds for the aircraft to maneuver to maintain well clear. This is rarely sufficient. The median 
response time with an ATC clearance of 27 seconds suggests that a reasonable nominal alert time before a LoWC 
should be at least 40 seconds in order to provide a buffer for more difficult encounter cases, and perhaps 
considerably more than this if intruders can be reliably identified at that horizon. Although somewhat counter- 
intuitive, the mean maneuver execution time is nearly identical for the two cases at 51.7 and 53.9 seconds (see 
Table 2) and the distributions are similar. This result suggests that pilots prefer to obtain clearances following the 
standard procedure, but that they will work to ensure they resolve a potential violation at a time appropriate for 
the given encounter, whether or not they have obtained a clearance. 
Table 2: Pilot response time and maneuver execution time statistics 
in Experiment 1. Only encounters in which the pilot successfully 
prevented LoWCs are included. 
Statistics in seconds 
Pilot Acted 
Without ATC 
Clearance 
Pilot Obtained 
ATC 
Clearance 
Median Response Time 16 27 
Mean Response Time 20.8 31.2 
Std. Dev. of Response 
Time 13.9 17.9 
Time-to-CPA at 
Execution 51.7 53.9 
 
D. Losses of Well Clear in Experiment 2 
The second pilot-in-the-loop simulation split the integrated display into four different variants of available 
tools. This display condition was the most promising system tested during Experiment 1, so it was natural to 
investigate which of the tools in that condition was most effective in reducing LoWC rates and LoWC durations 
when they did occur. 
Experiment 2 incorporated both cooperative and non-cooperative aircraft, so the number of LoWCs as a 
fraction of the overall encounters by time of first self-separation alert can be classified by the type of aircraft 
encountered as well. Figure 9a shows the outcomes of encounters with cooperative aircraft by time-to-CPA at 
which the intruder was first predicted to become a LoWC, while Figure 9b shows the same data for non-
cooperative aircraft encounters. The distribution of time-to-CPA of alerts for non-cooperative aircraft is smaller 
(median = 64.5 seconds), because the limited surveillance range reduces the time at which an alert can first be 
detected. The distribution of time-to-CPA for cooperative aircraft is around 110 seconds, because most of the 
time the surveillance system already detected and tracked the aircraft prior to the 110-second threshold. Both 
figures illustrate decreases in proportion of LoWCs as the time-to-CPA of the self-separation alert increases. Only 
two LoWCs occurred with cooperative aircraft when the alert time was greater than 20 seconds to LoWC (time-
to-CPA greater than 60 seconds), and only three LoWCs occurred with the non-cooperative aircraft. When 
excluding “popup” LoWCs, pilots were able to prevent LoWCs in 76% of the encounters with non-cooperative 
aircraft when alerted 20 seconds or less prior to losing well clear, and in 96% of the encounters with non-
cooperative aircraft when alerted more than 20 seconds prior to losing well clear. For encounters with cooperative 
aircraft, the pilots were able to prevent 50% of predicted LoWCs when alerted 20 seconds or less prior to losing 
well clear, and 93% of predicted LoWCs when alerted with more than 20 seconds. Although one would hope that 
no LoWCs occur regardless of the time of first alert, the self-separation system tested here is designed to deal 
with only those more strategic encounters that begin well outside the violation regime. A separate collision 
avoidance function would be employed to resolve self-separation alerts that occur less than 20 seconds prior to 
LoWC. 
 
 
(a)  
 
(b) 
Figure 9. Outcome of encounters (actual losses of well clear vs. those that were prevented) with (a) cooperative and (b) non-cooperative 
aircraft by time to closest point of approach at which SS alert was first provided. 
 
The proportion of all encounters that became losses of well clear by display condition is presented in Figure 
10. It is still unclear which advanced display feature from Experiment 1 affected the reduction in LoWCs, 
however, the proportion of LoWCs was slightly less with the addition of maneuver recommendations (Display 3), 
and the proportion of LoWCs was approximately 50% less with the addition of recommended maneuvers and a 
trial planning tool together (Display 4) as compared to the “Information Only” display (Display 1). However, 
none of the performance differences between displays was statistically significant (p>0.05). 
 
Figure 10: Proportion of encounters that became losses of well clear by display in Experiment 2. 
 
E. Severity of Losses of Well Clear in Experiment 2 
Similar to Experiment 1, determining whether a specific display reduces the severity of a LoWC is an 
important safety element when evaluating DAA displays.  The median time spent in LoWC for each of the 
display configurations is shown in Figure 11. The error bars in that figure indicate that only Display 4 produced a 
statistically significant difference (p<0.05) in median time within a LoWC.  The median amount of time spent 
overall in a LoWC was 4 sec across all the displays, which is an improvement from Experiment 1 (9 sec). The 
median time spent within a LoWC for Display 2 is approximately 50% less than Display 3; although the 
difference is not statistically significant, it suggests that the trial planner feature in the “Advanced Integration” 
display was more effective in reducing the median time in a LoWC than was the maneuver recommendation 
guidance.  
 
Figure 11: Median time spent within a loss of well clear by display condition in Experiment 2. 
 
The second severity metric is an index of the separation between the aircraft at the closest point of approach.  
The actual worst severity indices are shown in Figure 12 Figureas a set of blue bars. Although all the blue bars 
represent a set of LoWCs, they need not have a severity index less than one, and indeed the median actual index 
is 1.11. As in Experiment 1, pilots tended to separate their aircraft to the boundary of the h_sepCA = 0.8 nmi and 
v_sepCA = 400 ft thresholds.  On average, the severity index for all LoWCs from predicted to actual was higher 
for Displays 1-4 by 38%, 60%, 49%, and 44%, respectively. This verifies (suggests?) that the displays helped the 
pilots increase separation.  However, no statistically significant improvement (p>0.05) to the severity index 
existed across the displays when considering all LoWCs.  When including only LoWCs with non-cooperative 
aircraft, Display 2 had a statistically significant improvement at increasing the separation index (mean separation 
index increase of 69%) as compared to the other three displays.   
 
Figure 12: Actual and predicted separation severity for all LoWCs in Experiment 2. 
 
F. Maneuver Timing Results in Experiment 2 
Various statistics associated with pilot response time are presented in Table 3. The metrics are classified 
based upon whether or not the pilot obtained an ATC clearance prior to maneuvering, and then by (a) all 
encounter types, i.e., cooperative and non-cooperative  (overall), (b) encounters with cooperative aircraft, and 
(c) non-cooperative aircraft. Overall, mean pilot response time was significantly (p<0.05) shorter when pilots 
maneuvered without obtaining an ATC clearance (mean = 10.8 seconds) as compared to when they did obtain 
an ATC clearance (mean = 18.7 seconds). This result held for encounters with cooperative aircraft and with non-
cooperative aircraft. Moreover, pilot response times were shorter for encounters with cooperative aircraft in 
Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1. An analysis of variance of pilot response times between experiments found 
the improvement to be statistically significant (p<0.05). The shorter response times in Experiment 2 may have 
been facilitated by pilots’ opportunity to focus on the integrated display, which appears to be the most effective 
display. Also, because pilots in Experiment 2 needed only to train on the VSCS and not the CSD, their 
experiment days were shorter, possibly contributing to reduced pilot fatigue and better performance. Thirdly, 
improved training materials regarding procedures and methodologies for remaining well clear may have 
contributed to better performance. The largest pilot response time was for encounters with cooperative aircraft 
when pilots obtained an ATC clearance (mean = 24.7 seconds), which is intuitive as the superior surveillance 
information available from cooperative aircraft affords longer alert lead times, making it allowable for pilots to 
take more time in determining a maneuver to prevent LoWCs and obtaining an ATC clearance before executing. 
The main metric in Table 4 is time-to-CPA when the pilot executes a maneuver to remain well clear. 
Counter to intuition, the mean times-to-CPA at execution for encounters with cooperative aircraft are 
approximately the same, regardless of whether the pilot did or did not take the time to obtain an ATC clearance 
(76.8 and 77.7 seconds, respectively). This is interesting because, as described earlier, pilot response time was 
significantly less when the pilot acted without an ATC clearance; so, one might have expected the same trend 
with time-to-CPA at execution.  
The clarifying result is with time-to-CPA at first alert in Table 4. For these same scenarios, it shows that for 
encounters with cooperative aircraft, longer warning lead times (mean 102.0 seconds time-to-CPA) correlated 
with cases in which pilots did obtain an ATC clearance; the shorter warning lead times (90.9 seconds time-to-
CPA) correlated with cases in which pilots acted without obtaining a clearance. This suggests that pilots’ 
decision-making processes are influenced by the alert lead time. Furthermore, the target time that these pilots 
wanted in order to maneuver their UAS against cooperative aircraft was approximately 77 seconds time-to-
CPA—or about 37 seconds prior to losing well clear—regardless of whether or not the pilot requested and 
obtained an ATC clearance.  
Table 3. Pilot response time statistics from Experiment 2. Only encounters in which the pilot successfully prevented LoWCs are included.  
Total Response 
Time (sec) 
Pilot Acted Without ATC Clearance Pilot Obtained ATC Clearance 
Overall Coop. Non-coop. Overall Coop. Non-coop. 
Median 9 11 9 16 19 14 
Mean 10.8 13.4 9.8 18.7 24.7 15.9 
Std. Dev. 3.1 8.4 6.2 7.9 13.2 8.5 
N 85 23 62 87 27 60 
 
 
Table 4. Time-to-CPA at first alert and execution from Experiment 2. Only encounters in which the pilot successfully  
prevented LoWCs are included. 
Units: 
sec. 
Cooperative Targets Non-cooperative Targets 
Pilot Acted Without ATC 
Clearance (n=23) 
Pilot Obtained ATC 
Clearance (n=27) 
Pilot Acted Without ATC 
Clearance (n=62) 
Pilot Obtained ATC 
Clearance (n=60) 
Time-to-
CPA at 
First Alert 
Time-to-
CPA at 
Execution 
Time-to-
CPA at 
First Alert 
Time-to-
CPA at 
Execution 
Time-to-
CPA at 
First Alert 
Time-to-
CPA at 
Execution 
Time-to-
CPA at 
First Alert 
Time-to-
CPA at 
Execution 
Median 108 94 109 79 74 65 66 52 
Mean 90.9 77.7 102.0 76.8 76.6 66.2 76.4 56.5 
Std. Dev. 31.5 31.8 18.6 20.6 18.2 18.9 20.9 20.6 
 
Lastly, a statistically significant difference was observed in the time-to-CPA at the time of maneuver 
execution for encounters with non-cooperative aircraft between pilots obtaining an ATC clearance (mean = 56.5 
seconds) and pilots not obtaining a clearance (mean = 66.2 seconds). The difference here stems from the pilot 
response time distribution for encounters with non-cooperative aircraft, since the alerting times were about the 
same whether or not an ATC clearance was obtained. Figure 13 shows mean response time by time-to-CPA, 
classified by whether the pilot obtained an ATC clearance before maneuvering. As expected, response time is 
always larger in cases when the pilot obtains an ATC clearance prior to maneuvering except for when time-to-
CPA is 40 seconds or less, because in those cases the pilot almost always acts without a clearance. The largest 
difference in response time between the cases in which the pilot does and does not obtain an ATC clearance was 
for times-to-CPA between 70 and 80 seconds, and the smallest difference was for times-to-CPA between 60 and 
70 seconds. 
 
Figure 13: Mean response time by time to closest point of approach at which the first SS alert was provided  
classified by whether the pilot obtained an ATC clearance before maneuvering in Experiment 2. 
 
Regarding the displays’ effectiveness at enhancing pilot response times (see Figure 14), Display 3 and 4 were 
correlated with shorter response times by approximately five seconds when compared to Display 1 and 2. 
Displaying a maneuver recommendation to the pilot may expedite his action and enhance his ability to remain 
well clear; however, no statistically significant differences (p>0.05) in response time were observed among the 
displays. 
 
Figure 14: Mean response time by display condition in Experiment 2. 
 
V. SUMMARY 
The overall effectiveness of the DAA system that includes the pilot was evaluated so that operational and 
performance requirements could be determined. The relationship between specific display and algorithm features 
and the risk ratio of the combined pilot-DAA system was investigated. The first objective of this work was to 
study the effectiveness of the pilot–DAA system to remain well clear as a function of display and algorithm 
features. The second objective was to collect and analyze pilot performance parameters that will help improve 
DAA modeling in batch computer simulations. Over the course of two experiments, 21 professional UAS pilots 
evaluated eight different DAA systems. In the first experiment, the independent variables were the alerting times 
at which pilots needed to take action to remain well clear, the location of the traffic display (standalone vs. 
integrated), and the tools and informational elements available on the display. In the second experiment, new 
display types were examined, and the UAS encountered two categories of aircraft: those equipped with simulated 
ADS-B that could be displayed up to 80 nmi away and those without that were only detectable by a simulated 
radar (non-cooperative) within a range of 6 nmi.  
In Experiment 1, pilots were almost never able to remain well clear when self-separation alerts were provided 
15 seconds or less prior to loss of well clear (i.e., less than 55 seconds time-to-CPA). The “Advanced Integrated” 
display resulted in the least amount of time spent in a LoWC, which was the only statistically significant LoWC 
severity result. When maneuvering to prevent LoWCs, median response times were significantly shorter when the 
pilot did not obtain an amended clearance: 16 seconds without a clearance and 27 seconds with a clearance. 
There were fewer LoWCs in Experiment 2, because the pilots relied exclusively on the integrated display 
from Experiment 1, which resulted in fewer LoWCs than the standalone displays. No display in Experiment 2 
resulted in significantly fewer LoWCs than any other. When excluding “pop-up” LoWCs, pilots were able to 
prevent LoWCs in 76% of the encounters with non-cooperative aircraft when alerted 20 seconds or less prior to 
losing well clear, and in 96% of the encounters with non-cooperative aircraft when alerted more than 20 seconds 
prior to losing well clear. For encounters with cooperative aircraft, the pilots were able to prevent LoWCs 50% of 
the time when alerted 20 seconds or less prior to losing well clear, and 93% of the time when alerted with more 
than 20 seconds. Pilot response times were shorter in Experiment 2 due to improved training and methodologies. 
The mean pilot response time for all encounters when pilots obtained an ATC clearance prior to maneuvering was 
18.7 seconds, and it was 10.8 seconds for encounters when pilots decided to maneuver without obtaining an ATC 
clearance.  
As safety case standards are still being developed, it is not yet known whether these specific DAA system 
designs will meet the airspace safety threshold. However, these results suggest that integrating DAA traffic 
information together with the pilot’s primary tactical situation display may reduce the proportion of LoWCs.  
VI. FUTURE WORK 
Data collected in these experiments are intended to help determine minimum requirements for DAA displays 
and algorithms and improve the modeling of overall DAA system performance in non-human-in-the-loop 
simulations.  In order to evaluate whether a DAA system meets the safety case through batch non-real-time 
simulations, a “representative” model of the system is required.  A pilot response timing model will be built 
from the data included in Table 3.  Its basis will be a random sample from a Gaussian distribution and heuristics 
on whether to sample from the distribution for when pilots obtained an ATC clearance or acted without one.    
A third pilot-in-the-loop experiment is currently being planned.  The plan for this experiment involves 
increasing the fidelity of the surveillance model by introducing noise into the cooperative and non-cooperative 
sensor models as well as significantly reducing the range of cooperative sensors from 80 nmi to a more realistic 
value.  Also, a new separation standard for losses of well clear will be employed, and it will not be directly tied 
to a collision avoidance alert.  The Well Clear definition derives from the work performed by the UAS Sense 
and Avoid Science and Research Panel [15], which was then modified by the FAA [21] and now has 
concurrence from RTCA Special Committee 228, which is responsible for developing Minimum Operational 
Performance Standards for DAA equipment for civil UAS.   
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